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Equality Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and Prejudice: The Unequal
Application of the Universal Human Right to Equality
Dominic Abrams, Diane M. Houston,
and Julie Van de Vyver
University of Kent
Milica Vasiljevic
University of Kent and University of Cambridge
In Western culture, there appears to be widespread endorsement of Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which stresses equality and freedom). But
do people really apply their equality values equally, or are their principles and
application systematically discrepant, resulting in equality hypocrisy? The present
study, conducted with a representative national sample of adults in the United
Kingdom (N  2,895), provides the first societal test of whether people apply their
value of “equality for all” similarly across multiple types of status minority
(women, disabled people, people aged over 70, Blacks, Muslims, and gay people).
Drawing on theories of intergroup relations and stereotyping we examined, relation
to each of these groups, respondents’ judgments of how important it is to satisfy
their particular wishes, whether there should be greater or reduced equality of
employment opportunities, and feelings of social distance. The data revealed a clear
gap between general equality values and responses to these specific measures.
Respondents prioritized equality more for “paternalized” groups (targets of benev-
olent prejudice: women, disabled, over 70) than others (Black people, Muslims, and
homosexual people), demonstrating significant inconsistency. Respondents who
valued equality more, or who expressed higher internal or external motivation to
control prejudice, showed greater consistency in applying equality. However, even
respondents who valued equality highly showed significant divergence in their
responses to paternalized versus nonpaternalized groups, revealing a degree of
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hypocrisy. Implications for strategies to promote equality and challenge prejudice
are discussed.
Keywords: equality, human rights, prejudice, values
I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up,
live out the true meaning of its creed: “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal.”
—Martin Luther King, Jr. (1963)
The very first article in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights (UDHR) adopted by the
General Assembly of the United Nations Orga-
nization in 1948 states that “All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience
and should act toward one another in a spirit of
brotherhood.” Yet, Martin Luther King Jr.’s
dream of equality is far from fulfilled. In this
article, we consider how and why people may
espouse equality as an important principle, yet
not apply that principle equally to all groups.
We report an empirical test of this phenomenon
using a nationally representative survey of
nearly 3,000 adults in the United Kingdom.
Universal Conceptualization of
Human Rights
Fifty years after the adoption of the UDHR,
Willem Doise formally theorized and tested
the existence of social representations of hu-
man rights. For example, across four cultures
(Costa Rica, France, Italy, and Switzerland),
Clémence, Doise, de Rosa, and Gonzalez
(1995) demonstrated remarkable convergence
in the understanding of what constitutes vio-
lations of human rights (see also Doise,
2002). In a more comprehensive test, Doise
and colleagues asked participants from 35
countries to evaluate the 30 articles of the
UDHR (Doise, Spini, & Clémence, 1999).
The structure of the different rights was re-
markably convergent across cultures, and
closely resembled the original structure pre-
sented by the French jurist, Renée Cassin at
the United Nations General Assembly in
1948.
In several studies, Doise and colleagues
showed that people’s commitment to these prin-
ciples is related to their wider values. For ex-
ample, people who value universalism and self-
transcendence are more likely to be involved
with human rights issues and to believe that
governments are not doing enough to protect
human rights. In contrast, those who value con-
servatism and endorse right-wing political ide-
ologies favor restricting individual rights to
guarantee the functioning of society (Doise et
al., 1999; Spini & Doise, 1998). Moreover, they
tend to endorse the power of governments and
other institutions to decide upon the distribution
of human rights (Moghaddam & Vuksanovic,
1990).
Human Rights as a Function of
Intergroup Relations
In addition to these individual differences in
conceptualizations of human rights, intergroup
relations research suggests that support for hu-
man rights may depend on power and status
relations between groups. For example, re-
search has shown that intergroup ideologies
such as social dominance orientation (SDO) and
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) negatively
affect human rights support (e.g., Cohrs, Maes,
Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; McFarland &
Mathews, 2005; Stellmacher, Sommer, &
Brähler, 2005). People high in SDO prefer hi-
erarchical (rather than egalitarian) relations be-
tween social groups, while the opposite is true
for people low in SDO (Pratto, Sidanius, Stall-
worth, & Malle, 1994). Similarly, people high
in RWA tend to be less favorable toward ac-
cording the same rights to all groups. This is
because people high in RWA believe this would
allow unwarranted means of social control to
socially subordinate groups (e.g., religious mi-
norities).
There are also differences between minority
and majority groups’ emphasis on people’s
rights versus people’s duties. Specifically,
members of minority or low power groups give
higher priority to their personal rights, whereas
members of majority or high power groups give
higher priority to the duties that low power
groups need to enact (Moghaddam & Riley,
2005). Moghaddam and Riley argue that such
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divergence was evident during the U.S. civil
rights and women’s rights movements, whereby
these minority groups highlighted their human
rights, whereas majority groups focused on the
duties of these minorities (e.g., to obey the law,
at that time restricting the minorities’ rights).
Similarly, Azzi (1992) demonstrated that par-
ticipants who belonged to, or were primed to
identify with, a minority ethnic group were
more likely to advocate equal distribution of
procedural resources (i.e., political power) be-
tween a simulated ethnic minority and majority
group. Conversely, participants who belonged
to, or were primed to identify with, a majority
ethnic group were more likely to advocate a
proportional distribution of procedural re-
sources.
In line with these findings, Louis and Tay-
lor (2005) advocated a relativist advocated of
human rights, highlighting that affordance of
rights varies across contexts, time, the social
groups people belong to, and the social iden-
tities they espouse. People interpret human
rights relative to their ingroup, and so the
interpretation is affected by the group’s status
position within the societal hierarchy (see
also Worchel, 2005).
The picture is rendered more complex when
we consider that people typically have multiple
group-based identities, hence more than one
ingroup (Crisp & Hewstone, 2007). By impli-
cation, people also have multiple outgroups to-
ward whom their endorsement of human rights
may also vary. This suggests that inconsistency
in rights endorsements could arise because dif-
ferent ingroup-outgroup relationships involve
different frames of comparison.
Compatibility of Universalist and
Relativist Approaches
It seems to us that the universalist (Doise et al.,
1999) and relativist (Louis & Taylor, 2005;
Worchel, 2005; cf. Kymlicka, 2001) positions can
be reconciled. There could be a universal concep-
tualization of human rights, but these principles
can be applied differently due to the hierarchical
nature of human societies, and the intergroup re-
lations they embody. Therefore, we consider that
people’s endorsement of the value of equality may
not translate into application to specific groups,
because social identities, power hierarchies, and
ingroup norms come into play, all of which might
place greater value on some groups than others.
Defining Equality Hypocrisy
Empirically, individuals in Western societ-
ies generally support the abstract goal of hu-
man rights. For example, in 2002, poll results
showed that 90% of Americans rated human
rights as a goal that is very important or
somewhat important (Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, 2002, cited in McFarland
& Mathews, 2005). McFarland and Mathews
argue that this may reflect social desirability
concerns because endorsement of rights is an
essential part of North American, and more
generally Western, ideology. The researchers
found that when comparing people’s prefer-
ence for human rights versus national self-
interest goals, “promoting and defending hu-
man rights in other countries” was ranked
only as 12th out of 15 goals. This reveals that
individuals may preach human rights more
than they are prepared to practice them, at
least when choosing between the importance
of global rights versus national priorities.
Staerklé and Clémence (2004) explored in-
consistency between values and application in
two schools in Switzerland. Adolescents who
valued human rights highly judged sanctions
that violated human rights to be less accept-
able when applied to a murderer than to a
pedophile rapist, when applied to a thief than
to a drug dealer, and when applied to “hand-
icapped” children rather than to immigrant
children. In studies using minimal groups,
Maio, Hahn, Frost, and Cheung (2009)
showed that varying the situational salience
of equality values could also affect whether
they were applied to resource distribution be-
tween groups.
Support for the human right to equality
logically implies support for equality for ev-
eryone regardless of their race, gender, reli-
gious affiliation, sexual orientation, age, and
physical ability. Despite evidence that many
people agree with the notion that all human
beings should be treated equally, research on
intergroup prejudice leads us to expect that,
when asked more concretely, people will dif-
ferentiate which groups most “deserve” these
rights, thereby revealing equality hypocrisy.
Specifically, equality hypocrisy occurs when
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people express strong support for equal rights
for all, but then differentially favor equal
rights for some groups above those of others.
We believe that equality hypocrisy is inherent
in many, possibly all societies. The present
study explores its forms and possible influ-
ences in the United Kingdom—a country that
is usually regarded as relatively modern, pro-
gressive and liberal.
Intergroup Prejudice
Intergroup relations research has long estab-
lished that people are prone to express ingroup
bias, and that this might result from ingroup
commitment (Brewer, 1999), intergroup com-
petition (Sherif, 1966) or the motivation to self-
enhance and establish positive ingroup distinc-
tiveness by evaluating ingroups more favorably
than outgroups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Peo-
ple’s ingroup commitment might simply mean
that they view all outgroups as less deserving
than the ingroup. Potential intergroup competi-
tion may motivate people to deny equality to
groups that are viewed as competing with the
ingroup (either ideologically or materially).
Moreover, people may garner positive ingroup
distinctiveness, self-esteem and competitive su-
periority by ensuring that lower status groups
are not afforded the same “rights” as a majority
ingroup. Although these ideas have been tested
with regard to single specific outgroups (see
Abrams, 2015; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010;
Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), there does
not appear to be any existing research that
shows whether people apply ingroup preference
when they apply their values in the context of
multiple outgroups, or whether the type of out-
group would necessarily affect how they apply
the value of equality. This is surprising given
that most people live in societies that do present
multiple outgroup categories.
Motivations to Control Prejudice
Research has shown that the personal and
social motivations to control prejudice strongly
predict its expression toward specific outgroups
(e.g., Butz & Plant, 2009; Crandall & Eshle-
man, 2003; Devine & Monteith, 1993; Gon-
salkorale, Sherman, Allen, Klauer, & Amodio,
2011; Plant & Devine, 2009). People who are
high in internal motivation to control prejudice
show lower prejudice in public as well as pri-
vate contexts. This is because they want to be
free of prejudice (Plant & Devine, 2009). Peo-
ple low in internal motivation but high in ex-
ternal motivation to control prejudice only show
lower prejudice in public, but not in private,
contexts. This is because they want to be seen as
unprejudiced, but not necessarily to be free of it
(Plant & Devine, 2009). For example, Legault,
Gutsell, and Inzlicht (2011) showed that, com-
pared to a control condition, when people were
primed with autonomous motivation to regulate
prejudice (i.e., internal motivation) they showed
less explicit and implicit prejudice whereas
when primed with the societal requirement to
control prejudice (i.e., external motivation) they
expressed more explicit and implicit prejudice.
Although motivation to control prejudice is
compatible with advocacy of equality, and al-
though a liberal interpretation of such motiva-
tion is that it is consistent with a free and fair
society, these concepts are not necessarily syn-
onymous. For example, it is possible to envis-
age that someone could be unconcerned about
their own prejudice but still advocate the prin-
ciple of equality for all, perhaps for religious,
moral, or material reasons. Moreover, it is plau-
sible that someone who is highly motivated not
to be prejudiced could still be perfectly willing
to accept that society should tolerate inequality.
Finally, someone whose primary concern is not
to appear prejudiced may be motivated either
because they value equality or because they
prefer inequality but do not wish to be seen to
do so. Whether these motivations to control
prejudice similarly affect the ascription of rights
to different types of group, and whether they do
so independently of equality values, are inter-
esting and unexplored questions in both inter-
group relations and human rights research.
Minority Groups
Why might we expect uneven affordance of
equality to different minority groups? Different
societal groups are perceived and stereotyped
differently. Seminal work by Fiske and col-
leagues (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) in
the United States demonstrated that groups are
evaluated along two primary characteristics:
warmth and competence. The combination of
these two primary characteristics gives rise to
the perceived stereotypicality of groups and to
differential qualities of prejudice. Thus, groups
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that are seen as high in warmth and low in
competence are more likely viewed with pity
and to suffer so called benevolent, or paternal-
istic prejudice (e.g., the “elderly,” “house-
wives,” “disabled,” and “blind” people). Groups
that are considered low in warmth but high in
competence are on the receiving end of envy
and envious prejudice (e.g., the “rich,” “Asian,”
“Americans,” “Jews,” men). Groups that are
considered low in both competence and in
warmth elicit contempt (e.g., the “poor,” “wel-
fare recipients,” “Hispanics”), and groups that
are considered high in competence and in
warmth elicit admiration; these are often major-
ity status ingroups (e.g., “Christians,” “middle
class,” “White people,” “students”). Of course,
there are various blends of moderate levels of
these qualities, forming a middle cluster. In the
United States these include “migrant workers,”
“gay men,” “Arabs,” “Muslims,” “blue-collar
workers,” and “southerners” (Cuddy, Fiske, &
Glick, 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). Numerous stud-
ies have demonstrated that different groups are
evaluated in terms of the warmth-competence
stereotype dimensions, which in turn informs
people’s emotional and behavioral reactions to-
ward these groups (e.g., Cuddy & Fiske, 2002;
Cuddy et al., 2007; Glick & Fiske, 2001).
Cross-cultural examinations have also sup-
ported the four clusters of stereotype content
related to specific groups (see Fiske & Cuddy,
2006; Cuddy et al., 2009).
The Present Research
For the purposes of this research we examine
whether participants assign the human right of
equality differentially to different status minor-
ities as a function of the evaluative implications
of stereotypes associated with these groups. We
expect status minority groups that are known to
be stereotyped as warmer but less competent
(hence paternalized) will be judged differently
from status minorities that are stereotyped as
colder, or potentially more threatening (hence
not paternalized).
Policy Context
In 2005, the U.K. Labour government pre-
pared to merge the roles of distinctive commis-
sions (e.g., Commission for Racial Equality,
Disability Rights Commission, Equal Opportu-
nities Commission) with those of other NGOs
representing age, sexuality and religion under
the umbrella of a new Equality and Human
Rights Commission. To better understand the
implications of this merger, the Women and
Equality Unit within the Department for Trade
and Industry for the “Equalities Review” com-
missioned and conducted this research, which
provided part of the foundation for establishing
the Equality and Human Rights Commission
(The Equalities Review, 2007). It was the first
single piece of integrated U.K. research to at-
tempt to understand prejudice and values about
human rights in relation to all six “equality
strands,” corresponding to gender, age, disabil-
ity, ethnicity, religion, and sexuality. This pro-
vided a unique opportunity to discover how,
across a whole population, views about the
rights of these distinct groups would relate to
overall values about key human rights.
Paternalistic stereotypes depict social groups
as pitied and instigate feelings of compassion
and sympathy and a desire to help these needy
groups. Paternalized groups are those that are
targets of “benevolent” prejudice, which ac-
cords those groups low status and competence
but relatively high levels of warmth. As a result
they are treated as dependent and needy, deserv-
ing of sympathy, but are effectively pinned to
low status and power positions. The dilemma
for these groups is that they lose the “benefits”
of patronage and charity if they challenge for
higher status positions. Such prejudice is by no
means benign. For example, female victims of
acquaintance rape are more likely to be blamed
by perceivers who are higher in benevolent sex-
ism (Abrams, Viki, Masser, & Bohner, 2003).
Based on the stereotype content model (Fiske et
al., 2002; Cuddy, 2004, personal communica-
tion), among the six equality strands in the
Equalities Review, we expected people to apply
these stereotypes to women, older people, and
disabled people. In contrast, Black, Muslim,
and gay people were expected to pose various
types of threat (culturally or materially) and as
liable to be viewed as competitors vis-a`-vis
majority White British society. Thus, we clas-
sified these as nonpaternalized groups. We hy-
pothesized that the representative sample would
assign equal rights more readily to paternalized
than to nonpaternalized groups. The present re-
search examines how equality values and moti-
vation to control prejudice relate to equality
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hypocrisy, equality inconsistency and prejudice.
We examine the following issues in relation to
judgments involving women, people over 70,
disabled people, gay and lesbian people, Mus-
lims, and Black people.
Societal Equality Hypocrisy
If, on average, people in society claim to
value equality as a universal right more than
they are willing to attach importance to the
wishes and equality of opportunity for specific
social groups this suggests that the society man-
ifests what we term equality hypocrisy. The
hypocrisy arises because valuing equality more
highly for some groups than others is logically
incompatible with valuing universal equality.
Our first question is whether there is societal
evidence that the level of endorsement of equal-
ity values is not matched by support for equality
for specific groups in society (equality hypoc-
risy).
Individuals’ Equality Inconsistency
Societal hypocrisy could exist because all
individuals favor certain groups more than oth-
ers. However, these average societal differences
do not reveal a further aspect of equality hypoc-
risy—some individuals may differentiate levels
of importance they attach to the equality rights
of different groups more than other individuals
do. That is, individuals may differ in the extent
to which they show equality inconsistency.
Such inconsistency is potentially hypocritical
because it seems perverse to advocate greater
equality for some groups at the expense of oth-
ers. Therefore we consider the extent to which
individuals attach different importance to satis-
fying the wishes, and ensuring equal employ-
ment opportunities for each group (equality in-
consistency). We propose that, matching the
societal level differences, individuals’ equality
inconsistency will expose a contrast between
paternalized and nonpaternalized groups,
whereby the latter are liable to be regarded as
less deserving of equality.
Prejudice
We examine a measure of prejudice in the
context of employment: expressions of comfort
in having a boss who is from each minority
group (a specific form of social distance; Bog-
ardus, 1933). Because of their common link in
terms of intergroup relations, we expect equal-
ity inconsistency to be mirrored by a similar
pattern of preferences in social distance. We
also investigate the extent to which equality
inconsistency and prejudice are predictable
from an individual’s support for the value of
equality and their internal and external motiva-
tion to control prejudice.
In summary, we expect that while people
may agree with the general value of equality
they may not support equality equally for all
minority groups (equality hypocrisy). Further-
more, on the basis of intergroup relations theory
we expect that people may place higher value
on equality for paternalized than nonpaternal-
ized groups (equality inconsistency). We expect
that the gap in importance attached to equality
for paternalized versus nonpaternalized groups
should be lower among individuals who value
equality for all, and who are internally or exter-
nally motivated to control prejudice.
Method
Participants and Design
Data were collected as part of a specially
commissioned representative national survey in
Britain in 2005 (Abrams & Houston, 2006), a
time when Britain had a Labour (left-wing)
government led by Tony Blair that had wide-
spread popular support and was strongly pro-
moting universal human rights. The sample
comprised 1,289 men (44.5%) and 1,606
women (55.5%); total N of 2,895. Age ranged
from 16 to 93 years (M  46.07, SD  19.14).
The majority of participants (87.5%) were
White British, 4.8% were Black, 6.4% were
Asian, and 1.3% was coded as missing. Further-
more, the majority of participants (92.5%) were
non-Muslim, nondisabled (78.3%), and hetero-
sexual (88.7%). Of the participants, 35.2% were
in full-time employment, 11.3% were in part-
time employment, 21.9% were unemployed,
25% were retired, and 6.7% were in full-time
education. Of the participants, 60.3% had left
full-time education before 18 years of age,
13.2% held qualifications up to 18 years (“A-
level”), 13.5% had completed a university de-
gree, and 13% had completed another type of
college qualification (e.g., Business and Tech-
nology Innovation Council, BTEC). Politically,
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the sample was slightly left of center (on a
6-point scale that ranged from 1 definitely left
to 6 definitely right, the mean was 3.35, SD
1.30). Data reported in this article were from a
larger survey that assessed a range of societal
perceptions and attitudes (see Abrams & Hous-
ton, 2006, for details and descriptive statistics).
To keep the survey to a manageable length,
and because we had high statistical power due
to sample size, three versions of the survey were
administered to separate nationally representa-
tive samples each comprising approximately
1,000 respondents. All versions included mea-
sures of equality values, measures of the impor-
tance of equality, and motivation to control
prejudice, but the different versions included
specific questions about opportunities and so-
cial distance for two target groups only. Specif-
ically, each version asked about one group that
we considered subject to paternalistic prejudice
and one that was more likely to be subject to
traditional nonpaternalistic prejudice. Version
A asked these questions in relation to women
and homosexuals, Version B asked these ques-
tions in relation to people over 70 and Muslims,
and Version C asked these questions in relation
to disabled people and Black people.
Procedure
Data were collected between May 20 and
June 1, 2005, among 16-year-olds from Eng-
land, Scotland, and Wales. The survey was ad-
ministered by a polling company, TNS/
Omnimas, in their omnibus face-to-face
computer-assisted personal interviews surveys
to a nationally representative sample. Left- and
right-scale anchor points were counterbalanced
between participants (e.g., agree and disagree
were anchored alternately on the left or right
end of a scale for Likert scale items), and item
orders were rotated within sections of the sur-
vey.
Measures
Equality value. Participants were asked to
rate their agreement with the statement, “There
should be equality for all groups in Britain.”
Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree).
Motivations to control prejudice. We
used two items to measure internal and external
motivation to control prejudice. These were se-
lected on the basis of factor analyses of pilot
study data involving over 400 British partici-
pants. The items were the highest loading items
on the internal and external factors from Plant
and Devine’s (1998) scales. Participants were
told, “People sometimes make an effort not to
be prejudiced. To what extent would you dis-
agree or agree that each of the following reasons
describes your view?” The item for internal
motivation to control prejudice was, “I at-
tempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward
other groups because it is personally impor-
tant to me.” The item for external motivation
to control prejudice was, “I try to appear
nonprejudiced toward other groups in order to
avoid disapproval from others.” Participants
responded from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree).
Group rights. Participants were informed,
“Not all groups in society want the same thing
as the majority. How important do you feel it is
that the particular wishes of each of the follow-
ing groups is satisfied?” Participants responded
for each of the six groups (i.e., women, people
over 70, disabled people, Muslims, Black peo-
ple, lesbian women, and gay men). The re-
sponse options were 1 (not at all important), 2
(not very important), 3 (neither important nor
unimportant), 4 (quite important), or 5 (very
important).
Group equality. Participants were asked to
tick a box to indicate whether they believed
“attempts to give equal employment opportuni-
ties to [relevant minority group, depending on
version] in this country have gone too far or not
far enough?” The response options were 1 (gone
much too far), 2 (gone too far), 3 (about right),
4 (not gone far enough), or 5 (not gone nearly
far enough).
Social distance. The measure of social dis-
tance gauges respondents’ anticipated emo-
tional responses to varying levels of closeness
toward members of different target groups. De-
pending on version, participants were asked,
“How comfortable or uncomfortable do you
think you would feel if a suitably qualified
[target group person] was appointed as your
boss?” They responded using a scale from 1
(very uncomfortable) through 3 (neither com-
fortable nor uncomfortable) to 5 (very comfort-
able). To some extent this measure may also tap
respondents’ willingness to work for members
of the relevant social group, and therefore has
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implications for potential prejudice or discrim-
ination in the workplace.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
Correlation analyses revealed some signifi-
cant but small relationships between partici-
pants’ equality value or motivations to control
prejudice on the one hand and gender, ethnicity,
age, religion (whether Muslim), sexual orienta-
tion (whether heterosexual), but not disability,
on the other (see Table 1). Analysis of covari-
ance (ANCOVA; controlling for demographics)
tested for differences between versions (A, B,
C). These revealed no significant effect of ver-
sion on equality value, F(2, 2,892)  2.67, p 
.069, 2  .002, nor on internal, F(2, 2,892) 
.45, p  .638, 2  .001, or external, F(2,
2,892)  .05, p  .956, 2  .001, motivations
to control prejudice. To adjust for the relation-
ships in subsequent analyses all demographic
variables were included as covariates.
Equality Hypocrisy: Equality Value Versus
Group Rights
Our first goal was to establish whether there
was evidence of equality hypocrisy. We exam-
ined the percentage of respondents who selected
each response option for the equality values
item and the group rights items. Figure 1 shows
that, whereas 84% of respondents claimed they
value or strongly value equality for all groups,
fewer than 65% considered it quite important or
very important to satisfy the needs of Black
people, fewer than 60% considered it quite or
very important for Muslims, and fewer than
50% considered it quite or very important for
homosexual people. Descriptively, this amounts
to an equality hypocrisy gap of between 15%
and 30%.
Equality hypocrisy can be evaluated statisti-
cally by comparing the mean responses of
equality value levels with mean levels of group
rights and group equality for specific groups.
Because the response scales for equality value
and the other measures differ, we are cautious
about making direct comparisons, but they seem
meaningful to the extent that the highest score
for all measures (5) reflects a high priority for
equality, whereas a midscale score reflects a
neutral preference. With these caveats in mind,
pairwise comparisons between equality value
and each of these other measures were all highly
significant (df  801, ts  4.15, ps  .0001).
Compared with equality value, respondents
judged the group rights of paternalized groups
to be closer to the maximum, whereas they
judged the group rights of nonpaternalized
groups to be further from the maximum. Thus,
some respondents clearly do not attach equal
importance to the rights of different groups.
Overall, these descriptive differences show
clearly that people’s willingness to espouse
equality as a value is greater than their willing-
ness to ascribe the same rights and equality to
different groups.
Table 1
Bivariate Correlation Coefficients Depicting the Relationship Between the Main
Variables of Interest and Group Membership Variables
N
Internal motivation
to control prejudice
External motivation
to control prejudice Equality value
Age .006 .04† .09
Female 1,606 .06 .03 .01
Disabled 626 .03 .02 .006
Asian 184 .007 .08 .08
Black 140 .001 .02 .08
Muslim 128 .003 .07 .06
Christian 1,950 .04 .02 .04
Homosexual 327 .09 .05 .04
Note. N  2,895. Age is continuous; all other demographic variables are dummy coded (1
vs. 0).
† p  .10.  p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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Equality Inconsistency
The group rights data indicate equality hy-
pocrisy vis-a`-vis equality values, but they also
reveal differences in the application of rights to
different groups (equality inconsistency). The
next analyses examined group rights, group
equality, and social distance judgments to es-
tablish whether there were systematic statistical
differences between different target groups (i.e.,
equality inconsistency). We hypothesized that
participants would place greater importance on
equality for paternalized groups (women, peo-
ple over 70, and disabled people) than for non-
paternalized groups (Muslims, Black people,
and homosexuals).
Group rights. A six-level (target group:
women, people over 70, disabled people, Mus-
lim people, Black people, and homosexuals)
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted.
The effect of target group was significant, F(5,
13,830)  20.32, p  .001, 2  .01. All
pairwise differences were significant at p 
.0001 aside from a nonsignificant difference
between women and people over 70. Group
rights were rated highest for disabled people
(M  4.22, SE  .02), then for women (M 
4.15
,
SE  .02), people over 70 (M  4.14
,
SE  .02), Black people (M  3.78
,
SE  .02),
Muslims (M  3.62
,
SE  .02), and finally,
homosexuals (M  3.38
,
SE  .02). Impor-
tantly, consistent with our hypothesis a planned
comparison between the three paternalized and
three nonpaternalized groups showed a highly
significant difference. Group rights were rated
higher for paternalized (M  4.16, SD  .81)
Figure 1. Means for strength of endorsement of the value of universal equality (“equality for
all groups”) and of importance of the rights and advocacy of greater equality of opportunity
for specific groups. Higher means represent stronger endorsement. The equality value re-
sponse scale is from strongly disagree to strongly agree; the group rights scale is from not at
all important to extremely important; the group equality scale is from gone much too far to
not gone nearly far enough. Error bars depict standard errors.
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than for nonpaternalized (M  3.59, SD  .96)
groups, t(2,894)  38.38, p  .0001, d  .64.
Group equality. Because advocacy of
equal employment opportunity for different
pairs of groups was measured in different ver-
sions of the survey, we analyzed these judg-
ments using a 2 (Type of Group: Paternalized,
Nonpaternalized)  3 (Version: A [women, ho-
mosexuals], B [people over 70, Muslims], C
[disabled, Black people]) mixed analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with survey version as a
between participants factor.
Results revealed a significant main effect of
type of group, F(1, 2,454)  12.72, p  .0001,
2  .01. As predicted, paternalized groups
(M  3.73, SE  .02) were rated higher than
nonpaternalized groups (M  3.02, SE  .02).
There was also a significant main effect of sur-
vey version, F(2, 2,454) 5.41, p .005, 2
.004, whereby advocacy of group equality was
rated higher in Version C (Black people and
disabled people) than in Version A (women and
homosexuals; p  .008), and compared to Ver-
sion B (people over 70 and Muslim people; p 
.003).
There was also a significant type of Group 
Version interaction, F(2, 2,454)  16.37, p 
.001, 2  .01. Simple effects of type of group
within version showed that, regardless of survey
version, group equality scores were signifi-
cantly higher (all ps  .0001) for the paternal-
ized groups (women, people over 70, and dis-
abled people) than for the nonpaternalized
groups (homosexuals, Muslim people, and
Black people, respectively).
Within the paternalized groups, group equal-
ity scores were higher for people over 70 (M 
3.30, SE  .03) and for disabled people (M 
3.34, SE  .03) than for women (M  3.18,
SE  .03; p  .003 and p  .0001, respec-
tively), but there was no significant difference
in group equality ratings for people over 70 and
disabled people (p  .314).
Within nonpaternalized groups, advocacy of
group equality was rated significantly lower for
Muslim people (M  2.70, SE  .03) than for
homosexuals (M  3.07, SE  .03) and Black
people (M  3.08, SE  .03; ps  .0001).
There was no significant difference between
advocacy of equality for homosexuals and
Black people (p  .820).
Is Equality Inconsistency Dependent on
Equality Value?
A plausible reason for equality hypocrisy
across the population as a whole might be that
those who more strongly value equality for all
will indeed espouse greater equality for any
particular group. Those who value equality less
may express more divergent views about the
importance of equality for different groups. To
test this idea we divided the sample according to
whether their general equality value scores were
at the midpoint or below (not valuing equality)
or above the midpoint (valuing equality). We
then examined the scores on dependent vari-
ables for the paternalized versus nonpaternal-
ized groups. These analyses employed mixed
ANOVAs (Equality Value: High vs. Neutral
and Low)  (Type of Group: Paternalized,
Nonpaternalized). We examined responses to
three dependent variables, group rights, group
Table 2
Analyses of Variance for the Effect of Equality Value (High vs. Low) and Target Group (Paternalized vs.
Nonpaternalized) on Group-Specific Measures of Equality
Variable
M (SE)
F 2,850 df (2)High equality (N  2,432) Low equality (N  463)
Paternalized Nonpaternalized Paternalized Nonpaternalized Target group
Equality
value
Target
Group 
Equality
Value
Group rights 4.19 (.02) 3.66 (.02) 4.08 (.04) 3.24 (.05) 23.23 (.01) 42.19 (.02) 56.99 (.02)
Group equality 3.29 (.02) 3.07 (.02) 3.18 (.04) 2.81 (.04) 13.35 (.01) 27.56 (.01) 9.57 (.004)
Social distance 3.75 (.02) 3.58 (.02) 3.61 (.05) 3.23 (.05) 2.51 (.001) 30.07 (.01) 13.74 (.005)
Note. N  2,895. SE  standard error; df  degrees of freedom. All main and interaction effects were significant at p 
.05, excluding the target group main effect on social distance (boss), which was nonsignificant (p  .113).
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equality, and social distance. Results are de-
picted in Table 2.
All three ANOVAs revealed a significant in-
teraction between equality value and type of
group. For all three dependent measures, pair-
wise comparisons showed that all four means
differed from one another (ps  .05). The pat-
tern is consistent across dependent variables.
Respondents who valued equality more highly
did indeed advocate higher group rights, group
equality, and desire less social distance for each
specific group. However, even though these re-
spondents valued equality highly, they signifi-
cantly favored paternalized groups over nonpa-
ternalized groups, meaning that equality
hypocrisy persists. Indeed, when we inspected
the mean scores on group rights and group
equality among respondents who had selected
the strongly agree option for equality values,
even these respondents significantly favored pa-
ternalized groups over nonpaternalized groups
on both measures (ps  .001). For the social
distance measure, the difference was highly sig-
nificant among those who agreed (p  .001),
and nonsignificant (though in the same direc-
tion) among those who strongly agreed (p 
.131).
Motivation to Control Prejudice and
Equality Inconsistency
To examine the predictive effects of individ-
ual differences in motivation to control preju-
dice and equality value on equality inconsis-
tency we computed within-person variance
scores from ratings of paternalized and nonpa-
ternalized groups. For the group rights variable
we were able to compute variance using ratings
of all six target groups. For the group equality
and the social distance variables the variances
were computed using the target pair in the rel-
evant survey version (i.e., women and homo-
sexuals; disabled and Black people; people over
70 and Muslims). Whether or not version was
controlled for (by creating two dummy vari-
ables) made no difference to the findings. Be-
cause these scores tap within-respondent vari-
ance in judgments about the different groups,
higher scores reflect greater inconsistency.
We hypothesized that internal motivation to
control prejudice should be associated with
lower equality variance. Second, given that sur-
vey responses were observable (by the inter-
viewer) we also expected external motivation to
control prejudice to be associated with lower
equality variance. Therefore, equality value and
both types of motivation to control prejudice
should be associated with lower equality vari-
ance. In principle, if all three are high, there
should be no equality variance because some-
one who values equality for all, and who does
not wish to be or be seen to be prejudiced
should view the rights and equality of all groups
as equally important. We also propose, there-
fore, that equality variance should be maxi-
mized if equality value and both types of moti-
vation to control prejudice are all low.
To test whether internal and external motiva-
tion to control prejudice moderated the relation-
ship between general equality values and equal-
ity variances for each measure, we used Hayes’
(2013) PROCESS macro (Model 3 for multiple
moderation). In separate analyses of the within-
person variance of each dependent variable
(group rights, group equality, social distance),
equality value was the independent variable and
internal and external control were separate mod-
erators.
Group rights. Higher internal motivation
to control prejudice (B  .15, SE  .03, p 
.0001) and higher equality value (B  .15,
SE  .03, p  .0001) significantly predicted
lower variance in group rights. There was a
significant Equality Value  Internal Motiva-
tion to control prejudice interaction (B  .05,
SE  .02, p  .018) and a significant Equality
Value  External Motivation to control preju-
dice interaction (B  .05, SE  .02, p  .034).
Simple slopes analyses (Model 1) were
conducted to probe the Equality Value 
Internal Motivation to control prejudice inter-
action. External motivation to control preju-
dice was also retained in the model and en-
tered as a covariate. This revealed that
equality value only predicted variance in
group rights at low levels of internal motiva-
tion (B  .17, SE  .02, p  .0001) but not
at high levels of internal motivation (B 
.04, SE  .03, p  .118; Figure 2a). Im-
portantly, the effect of internal motivation
was smaller when equality value was high
(B  .05, SE  .02, p  .022) than when
equality value was low (B  .17, SE  .02,
p  .0001).
Similarly, simple slope results for the
Equality Value  External Motivation inter-
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action (with internal motivation as a covari-
ate) revealed that equality value only pre-
dicted variance in group rights at low levels
of external motivation (B  .17, SE  .03,
p  .0001) but not at high levels of external
motivation (B  .05, SE  .03, p  .073;
Figure 2b). Moreover, when equality value
was low external motivation had no effect on
variance (B  .005, SE  .02, p  .816).
However, when equality value was high, re-
spondents with higher external motivation
also showed greater variance in their re-
sponses (B  .10, SE  .02, p  .0001).
To summarize the overall pattern, we note
two points. First, the variance was greatest
when equality value, internal motivation, and
external motivation were all low. Variance was
smallest when equality and internal motivation
was high but external motivation was low. Sec-
ond, the relationship between levels of equality
and variance was strongest when both internal
and external motivations were low and smallest
when both were high. Post hoc inspection of the
simple slope for equality value within levels of
internal and external motivation showed they
were significant (ps  .05) except when both
internal and external were high, B  .03,
SE  .04, p  .347.
Group equality. Results revealed that
greater equality value (B  .12, SE  .03,
p  .0001) and higher external motivation
(B  .22, SE  .04, p  .0001) separately
predicted greater consistency (lower vari-
ance) in advocacy of group equality. Further-
more, there was a significant Equality
Value  Internal Motivation to Control Prej-
udice interaction (B  .10, SE  .03, p 
.0006) and a significant Equality Value 
External Motivation to Control Prejudice in-
teraction (B  .14, SE  .03, p  .0001).
However, this was qualified by a significant
three-way interaction between Equality
Value  Internal Motivation to Control Prej-
udice  External Motivation to control prej-
udice (B  .05, SE  .02, p  .008).
Simple slopes for the three-way interaction
showed that the effect of equality value was
greatest when both external and internal mo-
tivations were low (B  .25, SE  .04, p 
.0001). However, equality value no longer
predicted group equality when internal moti-
vation was high (B  .07, SE  .04, p 
.093) or external motivation was high (B 
.04, SE  .06, p  .466), or when both
external and internal motivations were high
(B  .02, SE  .05, p  .616). Similarly, only
when the equality value was low did internal
motivation (B  .15, SE  .03, p  .0001)
and external motivation (B  .20, SE  .04,
p  .0001) significantly relate to variance in
group equality. To summarize the overall pat-
tern, the variance was large when equality
value, internal motivation, and external moti-
vation were all low. Variance was smallest if
any one of these variables was high. The
relationship between levels of equality and
variance was stronger when both internal and
external motivation were low than when ei-
ther were high (see Figure 3).
Social distance. Higher internal motivation
to control prejudice (B  .21, SE  .05, p 
.001), higher external motivation to control
prejudice (B  .13, SE  .05, p  .010), and
higher support for the equality value (B.15,
Figure 2. Plots for the Equality Value  Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice interac-
tion and the Equality Value  External Motivation to Control Prejudice on variance in group
rights. Low and high refer to values 1 standard deviation below and above the variable’s mean,
respectively.
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SE  .04, p  .002) significantly predicted
lower variance in social distance. There was
also a significant Equality Value  Internal
Motivation to Control Prejudice interaction
(B  .11, SE  .03, p  .001). Simple slopes
analysis (Model 1 with external motivation en-
tered as a covariate) revealed that equality value
only predicted variance in social distance at low
levels of internal motivation (B  .18, SE 
.04, p  .0001) but not at high levels of internal
motivation (B  .06, SE  .04, p  .181; see
Figure 4). Similarly, internal motivation only
predicted variance at low levels of equality
value (B  .21, SE  .04, p  .0001). Stated
Figure 3. Plot for the Equality Value External Motivation to Control Prejudice Internal
Motivation to control prejudice interaction on variance in advocacy of group equality. Low
and high refer to values 1 standard deviation below and above the variable’s mean, respec-
tively.
Figure 4. Plot for the Equality Value Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice interaction
on variance in social distance. Low and high refer to values 1 standard deviation below and
above the variable’s mean, respectively.
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differently, variance was higher when both in-
ternal control and equality value were low than
when either variable was high. There was also
a marginal Equality Value  External Moti-
vation to Control Prejudice interaction on
variance in social distance (B  .07, SE 
.04, p  .068), which followed a similar
pattern. Although the three-way interaction of
Equality Value  Internal Motivation to Con-
trol Prejudice  External Motivation to Con-
trol Prejudice on group rights was nonsignif-
icant, B  .06, SE  .04, p  .124, we
conducted post hoc tests of simple slopes for
comparison with the effects on group equal-
ity, the relationship between equality value
and group rights was significant only when
both internal and external were low, B 
.27, SE  .06, p  .001. In summary, as
with group equality, the variance in social
distance was large when equality value, inter-
nal motivation, and external motivation were
all low. Variance was smaller when any one
of these variables was high. The relationship
between levels of equality and variance was
stronger when both internal and external mo-
tivation were low than when either were high.
Discussion
Can a society in which a large majority
claims to value the human right of equality for
all regard itself as meeting the requirements of
Article 1 in the UDHR? From this study of the
United Kingdom during one of its more liberal
eras, the answer appears to be that espousing the
general value of equality is not sufficient. The
present research exposes clear evidence of
equality hypocrisy because people were less
willing to endorse equal rights for specific
groups than they were for all groups. More-
over, this hypocrisy was manifested both at
the aggregate level characterizing society as a
whole (see Figure 1), and within individuals
who chose to prioritize the equal rights of
particular groups more than other groups
(showing equality inconsistency).
Evidence for Equality Hypocrisy
Whereas previous research has highlighted the
potential mismatch between overall human rights
support and application to specific groups (e.g.,
Staerklé & Clémence, 2004), the present research
examined whether people apply their equality val-
ues to the same extent across different intergroup
contexts and different types of minority groups.
Arguably, this is a stronger test of equality hypoc-
risy as it determines whether people do apply the
principle of equality equally across different types
of minority. Our findings showed clear support for
the existence of equality hypocrisy. Specifically,
respondents advocated equality as a value more
strongly than they advocated equality for nonpa-
ternalized minority groups. They also judged the
rights of some groups to be more important than
the rights of others. Strikingly, 22% were prepared
to assert that equality had gone “too far” for Mus-
lims.
Evidence for Equality Inconsistency
We proposed that differences in the application
of equality to different groups would reflect dif-
ferences in paternalistic stereotypes associated
with each group (Fiske et al., 2002). In particular,
we expected that because paternalized groups
pose little threat to the status or power of other
groups, respondents would be more willing to
grant equality to those groups than to nonpater-
nalized groups. Specifically, we proposed and
found that respondents advocated equality more
strongly for women, older people and disabled
people, than for Blacks, Muslims and homosexual
people. Importantly, differential equality in favor
of paternalized groups occurred regardless of
whether respondents were asked to consider all six
of these groups or whether they were asked to
consider one of three different pairings of the
groups. This evidence suggests strongly that
equality inconsistency in favor of paternalized
groups is not an artifact of demand characteristics
or measurement procedures, but is a robust effect.
Predicting Individual-Level
Equality Inconsistency
We then pursued the question of why equality
inconsistency between paternalized and nonpa-
ternalized groups exists and whether it shares a
common basis with intergroup prejudice. We
reasoned that people who value universal equal-
ity more highly should be more consistent in
their application of equality across different
groups. In addition, prior research has estab-
lished that people may moderate their expres-
sions of prejudice depending on both their per-
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sonal (internal) motivation to be unprejudiced,
and social (external) motivation to be unpreju-
diced. If application of equality values is related
to intergroup prejudice then these two motiva-
tions should also result in greater consistency in
the application of equality across specific
groups. However, we could not be sure whether
equality values would subsume prejudice moti-
vations, whether these different motives and
values would have independent additive effects
or whether they would interact. As far as we are
aware this issue has not been explored in pre-
vious research.
Across different measures, the results showed
that the motivations to control prejudice and
equality values had interactive effects. Either
high equality value or high internal motivations
to control prejudice were sufficient to reduce
inconsistency in judgments of the rights of dif-
ferent groups. Similarly, consistency in social
distance (prejudice) responses was greater if
either equality value or internal motivation to
control prejudice were high, than if both were
low. We note that the main effect of external
motivation to control prejudice differed across
measures. Future research may need to consider
why this might be.
Taken together, these findings are both en-
couraging and concerning. It is encouraging that
we have identified three possible ways to pro-
mote greater application of Article 1 of the
UHDR. One is to simply reinforce the basic
value of equality. Another is to promote moti-
vation to be unprejudiced, and the third may be
to reinforce the idea that being seen to be prej-
udiced is highly undesirable. The latter strategy
implies that people may in fact remain preju-
diced, but simply not show this publicly. How-
ever, reducing public prejudice may have ben-
eficial indirect effects through changing social
norms (cf. Aronson, 1992; Berkowitz, 2005).
Less encouraging is the persistence of signif-
icant equality inconsistency even among people
who we might expect to show none. Specifi-
cally, even those who most highly valued equal-
ity showed equality inconsistency. We believe
that this reflects the pervasiveness and power of
societal intergroup relations and stereotypes,
and indicates a need for future research to ex-
plore ways to break the social and psychological
barriers in the treatment of these different kinds
of groups. Our findings suggest that it may be
helpful if equality and diversity training can
promote equality consistency through multiple
routes, including appealing to people’s equality
value and also their motivations to be unpreju-
diced. The findings also highlight the impor-
tance of incorporating an intergroup relations
perspective within equality and diversity train-
ing. For example, one promising strategy en-
courages people to think of multiple counterst-
ereotypic social categories, thereby leading to
greater egalitarianism and lowered generalized
prejudice toward a multitude of both paternal-
ized and nonpaternalized groups (Vasiljevic &
Crisp, 2013).
Another promising intervention is the value
self-confrontation technique, which aims to ei-
ther change or stabilize people’s beliefs, atti-
tudes, values, and behavior (Grube, Mayton, &
Ball-Rokeach, 1994; Rokeach, 1973, 1975).
Rokeach’s classic studies asked participants to
rank a number of values, among which were
equality and freedom. Freedom was usually
ranked high, and equality rather low, which
served as the main point given in the feedback,
whereby Rokeach drew people’s attention to the
wide discrepancy in valuation of freedom and
equality. Rokeach surmised that participants
would be dissatisfied with this discrepancy,
which would lead them to change their values,
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors. The value self-
confrontation technique has been extensively
tested and results have been promising, espe-
cially considering the longitudinal effects of
this technique (Altemeyer, 1994; Ball-Rokeach,
Rokeach, & Grube, 1984; Rokeach, 1973). It
would be interesting and promising to apply this
self-confrontation technique to equality incon-
sistency.
Based on intergroup relations theories, we
proposed that equality hypocrisy and equality
inconsistency could arise for several reasons.
Equality hypocrisy (the general failure to apply
espoused equality values) may reflect ingroup
biases due to ingroup commitment, intergroup
competition, or social identity distinctiveness
and esteem motivations (Abrams, 2015;
Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Ellemers, Spears, &
Doosje, 2002).
An Important Applied Issue:
Relevance to Policy
Our research shows how attitudes to human
rights are expressed in ways that appear incon-
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sistent with people’s core values. We tested
these questions in a social and political policy
context that was actively promoting equality,
and that was engaged with the goal of protecting
and advocating human rights. After the 2007–
2008 world banking crisis, the Labour Govern-
ment was succeeded by a Conservative/Liberal-
Democrat coalition. One of the coalition’s
earliest acts was to cut the budget and size of the
Equality and Human Rights Commission dra-
matically. The coalition government launched
sustained criticism of the judgments of the
European Court of Human Rights, and be-
moaned the imposition of undue “political
correctness” from outside the United King-
dom. In this rhetoric a sustained theme has
been that of undeserving groups (those es-
pousing different values, foreigners stealing
British jobs, welfare scroungers, feckless
youth, and so on). Politicians have argued that
equal rights should only be granted to these
groups if they assume equal “responsibilities”
(an economic and structural impossibility).
We consider that the success of these rhetor-
ical strategies lies in their capacity to activate
intergroup motives and to drive a wedge be-
tween the rights of minority status groups that
are paternalized versus nonpaternalized. Nar-
ratives that contrast the deserving and unde-
serving groups or subgroups (among the poor,
immigrants, etc.) are particularly insidious as
they are likely to combine paternalistic prej-
udices (e.g., benevolent sexism) with nonpa-
ternalistic prejudices to sustain the status quo.
Paternalistic prejudice can ostensibly demon-
strate tolerance and consideration of human
rights, while nonpaternalistic prejudices dem-
onstrate defense of ingroup values and free-
doms. Yet, in this type of rhetoric, support for
minorities is conditional on their posing no
threat and remaining dependent, while denial
of rights to nonpaternalized minorities is jus-
tified with more overtly “hostile” forms of
prejudice that focus on the threats to ingroup
culture, economy or security posed by such
groups.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present research has several limitations.
One is that we did not use identical response
scales to measure equality value and equality
judgments relating to specific groups. Although
the response anchors were necessarily different,
and may have introduced differences in item
difficulty, these differences might also be con-
strued as a virtue in the sense that they reduced
the risk of common measurement effects and
reduced likely social desirability effects in
terms of trying to appear consistent.
We are aware that it is preferable to use
multiple items to measure constructs in psycho-
logical research. Single items are likely to yield
smaller effects and this may account for some of
the small effect sizes in the present research.
However, the advantage of a very large repre-
sentative sample and the use of pretested items
that are representative of particular constructs is
that what is lost in measurement error is par-
tially compensated for in statistical power. In
addition, small effect sizes can sometimes un-
derpin important substantive effects (Prentice &
Miller, 1992). The social relevance and gener-
alizability of our findings are greatly enhanced
by use of a large and nationally representative
sample, but we recognize that additional exper-
imental research could help to explore the rel-
evant processes and mechanisms in greater de-
tail.
An empirical limitation is that the research
was conducted only in one cultural setting.
Kymlicka (2001) argues that whereas Western
cultures can ideologically accommodate both
individual freedom and group rights under the
umbrella of “equality,” the same is not true in
all cultures. Notwithstanding that caveat, we
have several reasons for believing that the find-
ings and general processes at work will gener-
alize, at least to most Western cultures. First,
there was some cultural heterogeneity within
our national sample, and the findings emerged
when multiple demographic variables were ac-
counted for as covariates. Second, the general
phenomenon of equality hypocrisy, which we
observed across different types of group, echoes
the findings from other cultural contexts that
inconsistency exists between general equality
values and application to a single minority.
Third, the general principles underpinning the
stereotype content model have been shown to
have good cross-cultural replicability (Fiske &
Cuddy, 2006; Cuddy et al., 2009). Therefore,
even if the particular groups that are more pa-
ternalized differ between cultures, we would
still expect that people would more willingly
endorse equality for paternalized groups. It
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would be very useful for future research to
explore cross cultural differences in equality
hypocrisy to illuminate the generalizability of
the role of paternalization. Related to this ques-
tion is whether there are important nuances and
differences in equality hypocrisy as applied to
nonpaternalized groups, and particularly
whether there are situations in which they can
attract perceptions of being highly competent
without also posing a threat to majority groups.
There are several other interesting avenues
for future research. One would be to investigate
how other values articulate with group motives,
and how moral principles may be strategically
incorporated into group-based judgments (cf.
Abrams, Rutland, Ferrell, & Pelletier, 2008;
Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino,
2013; Haidt, 2007; Rutland, Killen, & Abrams,
2010). Another is to test whether equality in-
consistency can be reduced by priming specific
motives and values (cf. Legault et al., 2011;
Maio et al., 2009). Finally, although our mea-
sure of social distance implies certain behav-
ioral orientations and emotional responses to
minority group members (Kraus, 1995), it
would be useful if future research could exam-
ine behavioral outcomes more directly. To con-
clude, we hope that the present research pro-
vides a unique source of evidence and new
insight into equality hypocrisy and that, extend-
ing earlier work (Doise et al., 1999; Moggh-
adam & Riley, 2005), this will invigorate fur-
ther social psychological research in this area.
References
Abrams, D. (2015). Social identity and intergroup
relations. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.),
APA handbook of personality and social psychol-
ogy: Vol. 2. Group processes (pp. 203–228).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Associ-
ation. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14342-008
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M. A. (1988). Comments on
the motivational status of self-esteem in social
identity and intergroup discrimination. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 18, 317–334. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180403
Abrams, D., & Houston, D. M. (2006). Equality,
diversity and prejudice in Britain: Results from the
2005 national survey. Report for the Cabinet Of-
fice Equalities Review October 2006. Retrieved
from http://kar.kent.ac.uk/4106/1/Abrams_
KentEquality_Oct_2006.pdf
Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., & Travaglino,
G. A. (2013). A double standard when group mem-
bers behave badly: Transgression credit to ingroup
leaders. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 105, 799–815. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
a0033600
Abrams, D., Rutland, A., Ferrell, J. M., & Pelletier, J.
(2008). Children’s judgments of disloyal and im-
moral peer behavior: Subjective group dynamics in
minimal intergroup contexts. Child Development,
79, 444 – 461. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8624.2007.01135.x
Abrams, D., Viki, G. T., Masser, B., & Bohner, G.
(2003). Perceptions of stranger and acquaintance
rape: The role of benevolent and hostile sexism in
victim blame and rape proclivity. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 84, 111–125.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.1.111
Altemeyer, B. (1994). Reducing prejudice in right-
wing authoritarians. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson
(Eds.), The psychology of prejudice: The Ontario
symposium (Vol. 7, pp. 131–148). Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Aronson, E. (1992). Stateways can change folkways.
In R. M. Baird & S. E. Rosenbaum (Eds.), Bo-
gotry, prejudice and hatred: Definitions, causes
and solutions (pp. 185–201). Buffalo, NY: Prome-
theus.
Azzi, A. (1992). Procedural justice and the allocation
of power in intergroup relations. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 736–747. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1177/0146167292186010
Ball-Rokeach, S. J., Rokeach, M., & Grube, J. W.
(1984). The great American values test: Influenc-
ing behavior and belief through television. New
York, NY: Free Press.
Berkowitz, A. D. (2005). An overview of the social
norms approach. In L. Lederman & L. Stewart
(Eds.), Changing the culture of college drinking: A
socially situated health communication campaign
(pp. 193–214). Creskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Bogardus, E. S. (1933). A social distance scale. So-
ciology & Social Research, 17, 265–271.
Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice:
Ingroup love and outgroup hate? Journal of Social
Issues, 55, 429 – 444. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/
0022-4537.00126
Butz, D. A., & Plant, E. A. (2009). Prejudice control
and interracial relations: The role of motivation to
respond without prejudice. Journal of Personality,
77, 1311–1342. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6494.2009.00583.x
Clémence, A., Doise, W., de Rosa, A. S., & Gonza-
lez, L. (1995). La représentation sociale des droits
de l’homme: Une recherche internationale sur
l’étendue et les limites de l’universalité. Interna-
tional Journal of Psychology, 30, 181–212. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207599508246565
44 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC
Cohrs, J. C., Maes, J., Moschner, B., & Kielmann, S.
(2007). Determinants of human rights attitudes and
behavior: A comparison and integration of psycho-
logical perspectives. Political Psychology, 28,
441– 469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221
.2007.00581.x
Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justifica-
tion-suppression model of the expression and ex-
perience of prejudice. Psychological Bulletin, 129,
414 – 446. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909
.129.3.414
Crisp, R. J., & Hewstone, M. (2007). Multiple social
categorization. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 39, pp 163–
254). Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Cuddy, A. J., & Fiske, S. T. (2002). Doddering, but
dear: Process, content, and function in stereotyping
of older persons. In T. Nelson (Ed.), Ageism: Ste-
reotyping and prejudice against older persons (pp.
3–26). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Cuddy, A. J., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2007). The
BIAS map: Behaviors from intergroup affect and
stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 92, 631– 648. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/0022-3514.92.4.631
Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., Kwan, V. S. Y., Glick,
P., Demoulin, S., Leyens, J.-P., . . . Ziegler, R.
(2009). Stereotype content model across cul-
tures: Towards universal similarities and some
differences. British Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 48, 1–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1348/
014466608X314935
Devine, P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (1993). The role of
discrepancy-associated affect in prejudice reduc-
tion. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.),
Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive
processes in group perception (317–344). San Di-
ego, CA: Academic Press. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/B978-0-08-088579-7.50018-1
Doise, W. (2002). Human rights as social represen-
tations. London, UK: Routledge.
Doise, W., Spini, D., & Clémence, A. (1999). Human
rights studied as social representations in a cross-
national context. European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy, 29, 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
0992(199902)29:11::AID-EJSP9093.0.CO;2-#
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroup
bias. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey
(Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (Vol. 2, pp.
1084–1121). New York, NY: Wiley.
Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (2002). Self
and social identity. Annual Review of Psychology,
53, 161–186. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev
.psych.53.100901.135228
Fiske, S. T., & Cuddy, A. J. C. (2006). Stereotype
content and relative group status across cultures. In
S. Guimond (Ed.), Social comparison processes
and levels of analysis: Understanding culture, in-
tergroup relations and cognition (pp. 249–263).
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002).
A model of (often mixed) stereotype content:
Competence and warmth respectively follow from
perceived status and competition. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 82, 878 –902.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878
Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). Ambivalent stereo-
types as legitimizing ideologies: Differentiating
paternalistic and envious prejudice. In J. T. Jost, &
B. Major (Eds.), (2001). The psychology of legiti-
macy: Emerging perspectives on ideology, justice,
and intergroup relations (pp. 278 –306). New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gonsalkorale, K., Sherman, J. W., Allen, T. J.,
Klauer, K. C., & Amodio, D. M. (2011). Account-
ing for successful control of implicit racial bias:
The roles of association activation, response mon-
itoring, and overcoming bias. Personality and So-
cial Psychology Bulletin, 37, 1534–1545. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1177/0146167211414064
Grube, J. W., Mayton, D. M., II, & Ball-Rokeach,
S. J. (1994). Inducing change in values, attitudes,
and behaviors: Belief system theory and the
method of value self-confrontation. Journal of So-
cial Issues, 50, 153–173. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01202.x
Haidt, J. (2007). The new synthesis in moral psychol-
ogy. Science, 316, 998–1002. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1126/science.1137651
Hayes, A. F. (2013). An introduction to mediation,
moderation, and conditional process analysis: A
regression-based approach. New York, NY: Guil-
ford Press.
Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). In-
tergroup bias. Annual Review of Psychology, 53,
575–604. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych
.53.100901.135109
King, M. L. Jr. (1963). I have a dream . . .. Retrieved
from http://www.archives.gov/press/exhibits/
dream-speech.pdf
Kraus, S. J. (1995). Attitudes and the prediction of
behavior: A meta-analysis of the empirical liter-
ature. Personality and Social Psychology Bulle-
tin, 21, 58 –75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0146167295211007
Kymlicka, W. (2001). Universal minority rights?
Ethnicities, 1, 21–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
146879680100100108
Legault, L., Gutsell, J. N., & Inzlicht, M. (2011).
Ironic effects of antiprejudice messages: How
motivational interventions can reduce (but also
increase) prejudice. Psychological Science, 22,
1472–1477. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0956797611427918
45EQUALITY HYPOCRISY AND PREJUDICE
Louis, W. R., & Taylor, D. M. (2005). Rights and
duties as group norms: Implications of intergroup
research for the study of rights and responsibilities.
In N. J. Finkel & F. M. Moghaddam (Eds.), The
psychology of rights and duties (pp. 105–134).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Associ-
ation.
Maio, G. R., Hahn, U., Frost, J. M., & Cheung, W.-Y.
(2009). Applying the value of equality unequally:
Effects of value instantiations that vary in typical-
ity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
97, 598–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016683
McFarland, S., & Mathews, M. (2005). Who cares
about human rights? Political Psychology, 26,
365–385. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221
.2005.00422.x
Moghaddam, F. M., & Riley, C. J. (2005). Towards a
cultural theory of rights and duties in human de-
velopment. In N. Finkel & F. M. Moghaddam
(Eds.), The psychology of rights and duties: em-
pirical contributions and normative commentaries
(pp. 75–101). Washington, DC: American Psycho-
logical Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/10872-004
Moghaddam, F. M., & Vuksanovic, V. (1990). Atti-
tudes and behavior toward human rights across
different contexts: The role of right-wing authori-
tarianism, political ideology, and religiosity. Inter-
national Journal of Psychology, 25, 455– 474.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00207599008247877
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and
external motivation to respond without prejudice.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75,
811–832. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75
.3.811
Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2009). The active
control of prejudice: Unpacking the intentions
guiding control efforts. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 96, 640–652. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/a0012960
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle,
B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A per-
sonality variable predicting social and political at-
titudes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 67, 741–763. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.67.4.741
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1992). When small
effects are impressive. Psychological Bulletin,
112, 160 –164. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.112.1.160
Rokeach, M. (1973). The nature of human values.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Rokeach, M. (1975). Long-term value change initi-
ated by computer feedback. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 32, 467–476. http://dx.doi
.org/10.1037/h0077077
Rutland, A., Killen, M., & Abrams, D. (2010). A new
social-cognitive developmental perspective on
prejudice the interplay between morality and
group identity. Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 5, 279 –291. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
1745691610369468
Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social
psychology of intergroup conflict and cooperation.
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Spini, D., & Doise, W. (1998). Organizing principles
of involvement in human rights and their social
anchoring in value priorities. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 28, 603–622. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199807/08)28:4603::
AID-EJSP8843.0.CO;2-P
Staerklé, C., & Clémence, A. (2004). Why people are
committed to human rights and still tolerate their
violation: A contextual analysis of the principle-
application gap. Social Justice Research, 17, 389–
406. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11211-004-2058-y
Stellmacher, J., Sommer, G., & Brähler, E. (2005). The
cognitive representation of human rights: Knowl-
edge, importance, and commitment. Peace and Con-
flict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 11, 267–292.
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative
theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S.
Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of inter-
group relations (pp. 33– 47). Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole.
The Equalities Review. (2007). Fairness and freedom:
The final report of the Equalities Review. London, UK:
HMSO. Retrieved from http://webarchive
.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/
http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/equalitiesreview/
Vasiljevic, M., & Crisp, R. J. (2013). Tolerance by
surprise: Evidence for a generalized reduction in
prejudice and increased egalitarianism through
novel category combination. PLoS ONE, 8,
e57106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone
.0057106
Worchel, S. (2005). The rightful place of human
rights: Incorporating individual, group, and cul-
tural perspectives. In N. J. Finkel & F. M.
Moghaddam (Eds.), The psychology of rights and
duties (pp. 197–220). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association. http://dx.doi.org/
10.1037/10872-009
46 ABRAMS, HOUSTON, VAN DE VYVER, AND VASILJEVIC
Correction to Abrams et al. (2015)
In the article “Equality Hypocrisy, Inconsistency, and Prejudice: The Unequal
Application of the Universal Human Right to Equality,” by Dominic Abrams,
Diane M. Houston, Julie Van de Vyver, and Milica Vasiljevic (Peace and
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 28–46. http://dx
.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000084), the copyright should have been “© 2015 The
Author(s)”. The author note also should have included the following license
statement, “This article has been published under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC-BY, http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author and source are credited. Copyright for this
article is retained by the author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psycholog-
ical Association the exclusive right to publish the article and identify itself as
the original publisher.” The online version of this article has been corrected.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pac0000115
